Abstract: While it is well known that corruption is rampant in China, less is known about the secondary costs of corruption such as spillover effects. To that end, this study examines the spillover effect on the reputation of innocent group firms when one of their members commits financial fraud. We propose that when a firm commits wrong-doing that there is a “guilt by association” spillover effect for the other firms in the group that negatively impacts their performance and external financing support. Furthermore, we propose that board composition (i.e., proportion of independent directors; multiple board memberships; board ownership) moderates the relationship between financial fraud and spillover effects. To test the hypotheses, we examine all 83 associated innocent group firms in China from 2007 to 2011.

Abstract: The effect of CEO succession on firm performance has been an important while controversial topic. While prior research focuses on the human capital perspective, we extend the research from a social capital losses perspective. Specifically, we differentiate the effects of two kinds of social capital losses (self-broken versus alter-broken) on CEO succession origin. We further explore the effect of outsider CEO succession on firm postsuccession firm performance and the contingencies affecting the main effect from the view of social capital losses.

Abstract: In this study I highlight a unique characteristic of the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China – that is, SOE executives are essentially cadres of the Communist Party of China (CPC), being appointed and evaluated by the CPC personnel system. From this perspective, I develop a set of tentative hypotheses regarding SOE executive behaviors and thus organizational outcomes. I plan to further refine these hypotheses with in-depth case studies of several SOEs and then quantitatively examine them with a large sample study.

Abstract: By considering multiple reference points, I extend behavioral agency theory into stock ownership evaluation. I then apply my framework in hypothesizing how relative performance changes the risk preferences of executives. I propose that both present value of options and stock returns are negatively associated with risk-taking behaviors. In addition, managers granted with options are prone to engage in more risk-taking activities than managers own stock ownership, when firms experience poor performances. Finally, I posit that past relevant successful/ unsuccessful investment experiences can strengthens/weakens the predicted relationship between the value of stock options/returns of stocks and executive risk-taking activities.